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COSTS AND BENEFITS
FROM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
A STUDY OF GHANA*
by Kojo Yelpaala**

The subject of foreign direct investment in developing countries
has been characterized by a fluctuating love-hate attitude on the part
of many host countries. On the one hand, foreign direct investment has been actively sought because of the wide range of benefits
it can provide to a host nation; on the other hand, the activities of
the foreign investors are feared. Investment by large and financially
powerful multinational corporations may result in foreign domination of the national economic activities of the host state.
This ambivalent attitude has been the subject of numerous
commentaries by political scientists, economists and businessmen.
However, what is needed is the development of a systematic set
of policy prescriptions for a host nation to employ in its dealings
with foreign investors. This paper, therefore, seeks to develop such
a systematic approach which can be employed by a host nation such
*
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as Ghana. The basic question addressed in this paper is how a state
such as Ghana can receive all the possible benefits of foreign direct
investment at the least cost.
To formulate these desired policy prescriptions, this paper will
begin by examining the current governmental policies toward direct
foreign investment, as evidenced by statutes, decrees and development plans. These documents reveal the continuing desire of the
government of Ghana to attract, in a controlled manner, foreign
direct investment.
An examination of the economy of Ghana will show why
foreign investment is needed. The economy is fragile. There is
continuing overdependencc on one product, cocoa, as the nation's
prime export commodity, while plentiful natural resources remain
undeveloped. In addition, Ghana remains dependent on the importation of many basic goods. Consequently, chronic balance of trade
problems plague the nation. The government understands that
foreign direct investnent is needed to develop a wider range of
export commodities and to promote domestic industries that can
produce goods that are currently imported.
What is needed is a critical examination of the effectiveness
of current policies. Do these policies attract an adequate amount
of foreign investment that is appropriate to the needs of Ghana?
Recent studies suggest that direct foreign investment has not had the
desired effect upon the balance of payments problem in Ghana
or elsewhere in the developing world. In addition, such investments,
while leading to growth, have not spurred development. Nor has the
aggregate amount of investment to date been sufficient to spur such
development; further, recent trends suggest that the growth rate
of foreign investment in developing nations is declining.
The failure to attract appropriate and adequate direct foreign
investment is attributable, in part, to governmental actions which
discourage investment. These include restrictions on the repatriation of profits, renunciation of governmental debt and demands for
renegotiation of agreements. Another reason is the conflict between
the motivations of the host government and those of the multinational corporate investors. The existing relationships between
host countries and foreign investors are marked by accusations,
fears and mutual distrust. Finally, the incentives offered to potential
investors may not appropriately address the needs of the specific
investors whose projects coincide with Ghana's development needs.
While the picture appears bleak, it is not hopeless. The conflicts are not irreconcilable. When the wants and needs of both the
host nation and the foreign investors are clearly delineated, it should
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be possible to match them in a mutually advantageous manner.
This article will introduce a model which outlines the steps which
should be taken by the government to ensure that the foreign direct
investment benefits the investor while furthering the developmental
objectives of the nation.
The proposed model requires a cost-benefit analysis of foreign
direct investments, the ranking of alternatives and the choice of the
most feasible projects. It also requires the reversal of the investment cycle, with the host nation seeking those foreign investors
who best serve its needs. In other words, the host nation plays an
aggressive role in attracting desirable projects.
Pursuant to this model, the government, through a committee
to be set up for screening, evaluating and selecting foreign investments, would bargain and negotiate with potential investors. A
flexible system of incentives would be used by the committee in
the bargaining process. By tailoring a package of incentives to fit
the needs of a desirable investor, Ghana would be better able successfully to attract those investment projects revealed by the costbenefit analysis to be highly desirable.
While this model was developed with reference to Ghana, it
is applicable to developing countries generally. Any host nation
seeking the benefits of direct foreign investment may wish to employ a system, such as the one proposed here, that ensures investments which make appropriate contributions to the developmental
goals of the nation.
The Role of Foreign Direct Investment
in Ghanaian Development Policies
The intended role of direct foreign investment in the overall
economic development of Ghana must be ascertained before one
can analyze incentives and controls that would allow Ghana to
benefit from direct foreign investment at the least cost. Therefore,
I shall examine policy statements which set forth the government's
objectives in broad terms as well as the statutes and decrees which
implement those policies.
The Ghanaian government clearly set forth its economic policy
and the desired role of foreign direct investment in the economic
development of Ghana in the following terms:
Ghana's present economic policy is based on
the principle of self-reliance and the doctrine
of "capturing the commanding heights of the
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economy." This doctrine states that Ghanaians
should have effective control over the significant
areas of the economy; those which exert considerable influence on the total economy of Ghana.
This principle of self-reliance means that
Ghanaians should, as far as possible, rely on
their human and material resources for the
economic development of the country. 1
Ghanaians must have effective control over those sectors which
have considerable influence on the total economy of the country.
While the goals of the government are unambiguous, the actual terms
used are not. In particular, the terms "effective control" and "significant sectors" are susceptible to a variety of interpretations. This
could pose serious dilemmas in the implementation of the Ghanaian
policy.
In 1975, the Ghanaian Government instituted a five year
economic development plan in order to achieve economic selfreliance. 2 The plan includes policy directives to reduce the balance
of trade deficits through: (1) increases in foreign exchange earnings
resulting from increased exportation of Ghanaian products; (2) an
increased agro-based industrial effort based on native agricultural
outputs (e.g., fertilizer) which will reduce Ghana's dependence on
foreign production; and (3) the advantageous use of labor-intensive
3
industries in order fully to utilize Ghana's important labor resource.
In addition, one of the plan's major goals is the achievement
of 5.5-percent-plus per annum economic growth rate.4 Also part
of the general scheme is a call for varying degrees of governmental
1.

Outdine of Ghana'rInvestment Policy at 1.
2.
Guidelines for the Five-Year Development Plan 1975-1980 (AccraTema: Ghana Publ. Corp.,Jan. 1975).
3.
Id. at4.
This calculation, however, is based on several asId. Ch. 16 at 5.
4.
sumptions related to the growth rate of certain specified factors, such as population, the capital output ratio, gross domestic product, exports, and government consumption. Because of the speculative nature of these projections, the
growth rate for the Ghanaian economy should be seen as being no more than
the projection of an ideal growth rate. But see, U.S. Foreign Service, US.
Dept. of Commerce (Industry and Trade Administration) Foreign Economic
Trends and Their Implications for the United States July 1979 [hereinafter
referred to as FET 19791 where it is stated that real GNP grew "hardly at all
in 1978, and per capita GNP declined for the fourth year in a row, to a level
below that for 1970." Id. at 3.
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intervention in the management of certain economic indicators.
Thus, income, prices, and wages will be heavily regulated in order
to produce a minimum inflationary impact on the general economy
caused by the infusion of foreign investment funds. 5 In order to
diversify the export structure of the Ghanaian economy, balance
of payment controls will be in effect. Thus, an increase in the
international export market is sought for Ghanaian goods to accompany a decrease in Ghanaian dependence on foreign imports.
Therefore, the plan addresses considerations for the domestic, private and corporate investor.6 Foreign direct investment is needed
to Achieve the development goals of the Five Year Plan. In particular, it is needed to induce the transfer of technology into Ghana.
According to the declared government policy, transfer of technology,
both capital intensive and labor intensive, is needed--one for more
7
complex industries and the other for less complicated industries.
In pursuance of the policy of attracting direct foreign investment while insuring effective Ghanaian control of the economy,
the government issued the Investment Policy Decree of 19758
amended subsequently by the Investment Policy (Amendment)
Decree of 1975. 9 Read together, these two decrees divided the
economy of Ghana, for investment purposes, into four broad categories. The first category deals with sectors which are reserved for
only the state such as public utilities and the manufacture of arms
and ammunition. The second category delineates areas in which
there can be joint state/foreign ownership where the equity participation of the state ranges between 55 percent and 20 percent. 10 In
the third category joint Ghanaian/foreign ownership is required.1 1
In those industries where Ghanaian participation is mandatory, the
12
decrees stipulate a date by which participation must commence.
The fourth category deals with areas where foreign investors can
operate unhampered by legislative constraints. Projects associated
with complicated technology requiring foreign skill usually fall
5. Guidelines for the Five-Year Development Plan 1975-1980 (AccraTema: Ghana Publ. Corp.,Jan. 1975) at para. 17.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
quently by
11.
12.

Id. at para. 19 (a), (b), (c).
Id.
Investment Policy Decree N.R.C.D. 329 (1975).
Investment Policy Decree S.M.C.D. 6 (1975).
Investment Policy Decree N.R.C.D. 329 (1975); amended subseInvestment Policy (Amendment) Decree S.M.C.D. 6 Part III (1975).
Id. PartII.
Id. Part.
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within this fourth category. 13 While not officially required, the
decree "suggests" that the foreign investor consult with Ghanaian
their familiarity with business methods and customs
citizens because
14
is beneficial.
In addition, there is a fifth category previously designated
only for Ghanaian private citizens. Enterprises which do not require
substantial capital outlay and complicated technology belong to15this
category: aliens are effectively eliminated from these industries.
Since Ghanaian participation, either governmental or private,
is required in all but the fourth category, government policy as set
forth in investment policy decrees seeks to reap the advantages of
foreign investment while increasing Ghanaian control over the
economy.
Basically, the attitude of the government of Ghana toward
foreign direct investment has not changed since Ghana achieved
independence in 1957. Political independence, according to the
government of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana,
did not make sense if the economy of Ghana was still dominated
and controlled by the former colonial master, Britain, or by any
other neo-colonialist power. 1 6 Political and economic independence
must come together or liberation would be a mere farce. However,
the economy of Ghana in 1957 was still dominated by alien monopoly interests, a relic of the colonialism to be eradicated. 1 7
One of the major governmental objectives for foreign direct

13. Investment Policy Decree N.R.C.D. 329 (1975); amended subsequently by Investment Policy (Amendment) Decree S.M'C.D. 6 (1975).
14. Outline of Ghana'sInvestment Policy at 2.
15. See Ghana's Investment Policy Decree, Part 1 (1975).
16. K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism 15-36
(1965); see also R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana
(1969).
17. R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana
60.65 (1969). See also A. G. Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment,
in Imperialism and Underdevelopment (R. Rhodes ed. 1970). He holds erroneous the view that the development of these underdeveloped countries, including
their most underdeveloped domestic areas, must and will be accomplished by
diffusing capital and institutions of the international and national metropoles.
Furthermore, since expansion of capitalism through history penetrated even the
most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world, the underdeveloped sectors
are as much a result of capitalist exploitation as are the more modem or capitalist features of the national metropoles of these underdeveloped countries. Id.

N.Y.J. Int'l & Comp. L.

[Vol. II

investment is to ensure maximum development and efficiency of
the Ghanaian economy. However, since. transnational corporations,
which represent the major source of foreign investment, have profit
maximization as their major objective, areas of conflict will be
inevitable. There is a fear that history will repeat itself with multinational corporations playing the role of their former colonial
masters.
Hence, there is a growing national xenophobia against
economic dominance by foreigners generally called economic nationalism. 18 As suggested by Dr. Nkrumah, however, it is the uncontrolled foreign investment, rather than foreign investment per se,
which leads to the impoverishment of less developed countries.
All the governments since the overthrow19 of Nkrumah have been
guided by these same basic considerations.

The State of the Ghanaian Economy
Given the growing fear of foreign capital, can Ghana realistically achieve its economic goals without compromising its goal of
self-determination? An answer to this question demands an examination of the fragile nature of the Ghanaian economy. The economy
is largely dependent on major importation of goods and services
and the exportation of primary products. 20 An examination 2of1
import-export activity by Tony Killick clearly supports this view.
18. Cateora, The Multinational Enterprise and Nationalism, MSU Business Topics, Spr. 1971, at 51.

19.

R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana,

at 62, n. 4 (1969).

However, there has been a clear change in the emphasis

on the sectors in which foreign direct investment can take place.

Under the

CPP government fast industrialization was the fundamental thrust of economic
development of a socialist Ghana. The government was to play a major role in
obtaining capital and spearheading industrialization by controlling, factors of
production. Hence private industrial activity was encouraged, but a limit was
put on how much foreign investors could invest in Ghana (not more than 100
million pounds). Under the present military regime there is a great emphasis on
the development of agriculture. -Though industrial activity is encouraged,
foreign investment is solicited in the agricultural sector in line with the Operation Feed Yourself Program of the military regime. See text accompanying note
2 supra.
20. See 'FET 1979, supra note 4, at 4. Ghana remains the third largest
market for U.S. exports in sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. sales in 1978 totaled

$124 million.
21.

See generally R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development
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The export sector has been, over the years, dominated by a single.
product, cocoa,
the world price of which suffers violent
22
fluctuations.
The dependence of the Ghanaian economy on the exportation
of cocoa has produced a serious and chronic balance of payment
problem. Continued high consumption of foreign goods 2 3 combined
with the 2 wide
fluctuation in the price of cocoa 24 underlies this
5
problem.
Foreign direct investment could ease the foreign exchange
situation through the infusion of foreign capital and the development of industries in those sectors that encourage import substitution in essential goods. 2 6 This will reduce the propensity to consume foreign imported goods. 2 7 Import substitution would produce the highest savings if local resources were used. Most developing countries undertake industrial development using this method
because a market exists for basic products that do not require
in Ghana (1969).
22. See Barclays ABECOR Country Report-Ghana 2 (April, 1979).
23. FET 1979, supra note 4, reports that the reduction of imported
goods has begun.
24. See FET 1979, supra note 4. Cocoa exports account for 65-70% of
all export earnings and 35% of government revenues. Production has been
declining and the situation is tenuous. Id. at 7.
25. International Monetary Fund, 6 Surveys of African Economics 201
(1975).
Since 1969 the system of import licensing has been relaxed. As a result,
domestic demand for imported goods coupled with declining cocoa prices led
to a rising balance of payments deficit. Rather than restricting-imports, government authorities relied on the introduction of import surcharges, exchange
taxes, and an export bonus scheme. See FET 1979, supra note 4, at 6, where
it states that export bonuses that had been reduced from 20-30% to 10% were
to be eliminated as of September 1979. See generally Guidelines for the FiveYear Development Plan 1975-1980 (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publ. Corp., Jan.
1975) at para. 18. Balance of payment controls will be in effect in order to
achieve the government policy of diversifying the export structure of the
Ghanaian economy. An increase in the international export market is sought
for Ghanaian-produced goods. Lowering Ghanaian dependence on foreign
imports is also an aim of the government. See also FET 1979, supra note 4,
at 6. The list of goods banned from importation is an additional measure to
improve the balance of payments situation.
26. See notes 2.6 supra.
27. S. Robock, K. Simmonds & J. Zwick, International Business and
Multinational Enterprises 380 (1977).
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of capital outlay,. complicated technology,
substantial amounts
28
and complex skills.
In addition, Ghana should also encourage foreign direct investment in sectors producing finished and half-finished manufactured
goods for export. A dual purpose is served by this policy. These
products could be sold in the domestic market as well as in foreign
countries. Ghana's foreign exchange and balance of payment situation would thus be greatly improved.
Ghana's economy would also be strengtened by a broader
industrial tax base, increased jobs, access to foreign markets, the
transfer of management expertise, better production skills, improved resource allocation and capacity utilization and improved
All these could be
mechanization in the agricultural sector. 29
brought about by the infusion of foreign capital, the main objective
being to reduce the dependence on imports through diversification
in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Perhaps the most appealing sector of the economy for possible
foreign direct investors is agriculture. 3 0 A wide range of primary
products could be produced for local consumption as well as for
export. 3 1 Therefore, Ghana is encouraging exploration of this
untapped source by the foreign investor.
As compared with other West African countries, Ghana is
blessed with a relatively well-developed infrastructure and a high
potential for corper capita income which offers good production
32
porations whose target market is Ghana.
Multinational Corporate Investors
One must consider the characteristics of those who provide
direct investment in Ghana. When one speaks of these investors,
28.
United Nations, Industrialization and Development: Progress and
Problems in Developing Countries,.8 J. Dev. Plan. 1, 75. II. A. 1, ST/ESA/20
(1975).
See generally S. Robock, K. Simmonds, J. Zwick, International
29.
Business and Multinational Enterprises 449 (1977).
30. Guidelines for the Five-Year Plan 1975-1980 12 (Accra-Tema:
Ghana Publ. Corp., 1975).
31. See FET 1979, supra note 4, at 5. Agricultural production, timber
processing and mining are considered primary areas for development. Ghana
News,Jan. 13, 1976,at 7,col. 1.
32. But see FET 1979, supra note 4, at 3. See also note 60 infra.
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for practical purposes, it is the multinational corporations which
must be considered. Multinational corporations (MNCs) account
for most of the foreign direct investment in the world. 3 3 According
to completed figures for the last decade, foreign direct investment
totaled over $150 billion before 1970. 3 4 Most of this amount was
invested by MNCs. The dominant role of MNCs in foreign direct
investment has given rise to concern in various
sectors which justi35
fies an extensive coverage of MNC activities.
Only a few countries have foreign direct investment in excess
of one billion. Only a few of these account for 43 percent of the
total foreign direct investment in developing nations. 3b This foreign
investment has been concentrated in specific sectors. In Africa,
Central and South America, and the Middle East, MNCs' investments are predominantly in extractive industries (especially in
petroleum or mining). 3
However, the preponderant position
in extractive industries may now be declining due to increasing
control by nation states over their natural resources. In addition,
the growing gap in investment activities between developed and
developing countries reflects the trend in foreign direct investment
in general, rather than MNC policy. 3 8 The total picture does not
appear to be very promising for the developing countries. The
gap may continue to widen with a continuing decline in foreign
investments.
For instance, in Africa, foreign direct investment
has faced a continuous decline. The growth rate of foreign direct
investment dropped from 52 percent in 1929 to about 37 percent
39
in 1960 and by the end of 1970 it further decreased to 28 percent.
33. United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development
5 (1973).
34. Horst, The Theory of the Firm, in Economic Analysis and the
Multinational Enterprise 31 U. Dunning ed. 1974). See also Stevens, The
Determinants of Investment, in id. at 47. See also FET 1979, supra note 4, at
4. U.S. direct investment in Ghana totaled 5325 million.
35. J.J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (1968). See genera/ly F. Knickerbocker, Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise
(1973); United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development
6 (1973).
36. United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development
19 (1973).
37. See, e.g., Ghana News, Jan. 13, 1976 at 7-8 col. 1-3.
38. Report by Secretariat of UNCTAD, 6 U.N. CTAD, Chapter I1,
U.N. Doc. TD/B. 466.88 (1973).
39. See, e.g., Hveem, The Extent and Type of Direct ForeignInvestment
in Africa, in Multinational Firms in Africa 73 (C. Widstrand ed. 1975). The
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Analysis of the distribution of foreign direct investments in
Ghana reveals that as of 1967 just below a third of the total of
foreign direct investments was in mining and smelting. Investments in
manufacturing were about 27 percent, 21 percent in trade and 17 percent in petroleum industries. Banking accounted for 4 percent. At
that time, agriculture was the least attractive to foreign investors. 0
Motives Behind Foreign Direct Investment
Given both the basic characteristics of potential foreign investors such as MNCs and current worldwide trends in foreign investment, one might wonder what the fundamental motivations behind
foreign direct investments in developing nations such as Ghana are.
Although there is a wide divergence of opinion, it appears that the
nature and character of foreign investors provide the answer.
Business imperatives have long dictated that profit motives
override philanthropic considerations in any business venture.
However, there is growing controversy over the centrality of the
profit motive as the major stimulus for investing in a particular
country. MNCs, it is argued, are mainly concerned with overall
growth and maximization of profits. 4 1 Therefore, operating losses
incurred in one country may have significant effect on the general
strategy and profits of the company as a whole. However, it seems
more likely that the profit motive remains the impetus behind
foreign investment in Ghana. The volatility of governmental sentiments towards foreign economic domination has produced high investment risk for foreign investors, hence they require high rates
of return as an incentive to invest. 4 2 The fear of violent political
fluctuations has led the MNCs to require freedom in the repatriation
of their profits to avoid the risk of losses that may result from
author estimates that while investment in developing countries has grown, it
has not kept pace proportionately with foreign investment in developed countries, thus reflecting an actual decline.
40. Id. at 86.
41. Horst, The Theory of the Firm, in Economic Analysis and the
Multinational Enterprise 31 (J. Dunning ed. 1974). See also Stevens, The
Determinants of Investment, in id. 47.
42. G. Reuber, Private Foreign Investment in Development 98 (1973).
See also Ghanaian Times, What Price Foreign Investment?, Jan. 27, 1977, at
4, col. 3. Danish companies, it is stated, were not prepared to invest in a developing country unless a 20-25% after-tax profit could be expected from the
invested capital.
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sudden radical changes of government.
Foreign investors have adopted the strategy of self-sufficiency
within the enterprise 4 3 by seeking out natural resources and primary
products abroad to feed their industries at home. This type of
operation is what Dunning described as backward vertical integration
because it involves securing and exploiting the raw materials of the
developing world for the benefit of the company's operations in its
home state. 4 4 The need for a continuous flow of raw materials
to feed the factories of the industrialized world still exists, therefore foreign investors will continue to look for them in Ghana and
other developing nations. It is therefore easy to understand why
such a large proportion of foreign investment is directed to extractive industries. However, in recent years, investments in that
sector have started to decline because of growing tensions between
the governments and foreign investors. 4 5 The nationalization or
majority equity participation of the Government of Ghana in the
46
mining concessions is a case in point.
Manufacturing opportunities are also beginning to attract
43. R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay 19 (1971).
44. Dunning, The Multinational Enterprise, Lloyds Bank Rev. July
1970, at 19, 22; see also Vernon, International Investment and International
Trade in the Product Cycle, 80 QJ. Econ. 190, 203 (1966).
45. R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral
Industries (1971).
46. Ghana Investment Policy Decree, Part II, sec. 9, at 3 (1975); see also
id. at Part III, sec. 12 and 13(a), at 4.
Some of the claims for a new international economic
order pertain to private foreign investment in developing
countries... [F] oreign investment has been too expensive for them, has threatened their economic independence and has caused disintegration of their economies.
Therefore, the developing countries now claim more
control over foreign investment. The most controversial
of their claims is that they demand the right to nationalize foreign-owned companies according to their own
laws (regarding compensation, etc.) ... [T] he claims are
put forward by the whole group of developing countries
and not only by the socialist ones. This reflects that
even in non 4ocialist developing countries the government and the local industrialists have become more
nationalistic ... [B] y demanding the right to carry out
the nationalizations according to their own laws (which
means, in effect, rejecting the principle of full compensation) they may deter potential foreign investors.
This reflects the growing disenchantment in developing
countries regarding foreign investment.
Ghanaian Times, What Price ForeignInvestment? Jan. 27, 1977, at 4, col. 5. See
also note 84 infra.
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foreign investors to developing nations for several reasons. First,
manufacturing would be undertaken to protect markets already
developed through exports which are now threatened by barriers
of entry to the markets of the developing nations by local and/or
foreign competitors. 4 7 Secondly, this type of investment seems to
be cost advantageous. Lower costs of labor and material appear
to play a significant role in the location of a foreign manufacturing
facility. Thirdly, a widely accepted reason for a foreign manufactur48
ing plan is the product cycle hypothesis put forward by Vernon.
According to this hypothesis, innovations are first marketed in the
wealthier nations. When the technology becomes common and the
market expands and economies of scale assume a position of importance, then production is started in a foreign country.
Finally, a recent development is investment in manufacturing
facilities that produce component parts or semi-finished products
in developing countries. 4 9 These operations are export oriented
and generally do not produce products for domestic consumption
in the host nations. The products are normally shipped to a central
location for distribution to various points. (For example, the Volta
Aluminum Company (Valco) smelter facility in Ghana manufactures
semi-finished aluminum ingots to supply the plants of the parent
company in the United States.) Moreover, the risk inherent in
relying on Ghanaian production of a finished product is reduced.
Foreign investors would be attracted to investment in Ghana
and other developing nations for several other reasons including
rent on knownarrowing profits at home, maximizing 5 economic
1
ledge, 5 0 and avoiding anti-trust sanctions.
47. . R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay 66 (1971). But see FET 1979,
supra note 4. "Rising labor costs and the government's price control policies
have discouraged investment in, and expansion of, the manufacturing sector in
recent years." Id. at 9.
48. R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay 65 - 106 (1971). Available capital
and advanced technology provide sufficient impetus for firms in developed
countries to produce new and innovative products and processes. Because of
their position of comparative advantage, these firms are able to exploit foreign,
less developed markets. They do so by exporting their ideas and products to
foreign countries. When their export position is threatened, overseas subsidiaries are established to exploit what remains of their oligopolistic advantage.
49. United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development
30 (1973).
. 50. Parry, The InternationalFirm and National Economic Policy: A
Survey of Some Issues, 83 Econ. J. 1201, 1203 (1973).
51.
1. A. Litvak & C. J. Maule, Foreign Investment: The Experience
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Incentives
The incentives used by Ghana to attract foreign investment
must be examined. Facially, they are a liberal set of inducements
which should be attractive to the multinational corporate investor.
They must be considered, however, in light of the government policies and actions which act as disincentives. These disincentives can
negate the advantages of investing in Ghana and drive away the
foreign investors that the government seeks to attract.
Ghana's approach to acquiring foreign direct investment is a
generalized approach to all potential investors and is similar to that
of most other developing countries. 5 2 This approach is buttressed
by several policy, legislative, and economic inducements aimed at
removing obstacles likely to operate as disincentives to foreign investments. Policy oriented inducements have been issued by the
government at various times through different channels. 5 3 The
high rate at which foreign direct investment is sought may be some
indication of how badly Ghana needs foreign investments to support
its five-year development plan.
Policy statements alone are not the only indicators of government intention as a wide range of liberal legislative and economic inducements have been introduced. Most of these inducements are contained in the Capital Investments Decree of 1973.
The Decree provides, inter alia, employment tax credits, 5 4 tax
of Host Countries (1970). United States Court rulings with respect to mergers
have been restrictive with the result that United States firms, in seeking to
escape anti-trust policies, pursued overseas expansion. But see United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), which indicates that
United States courts would have jurisdiction over their nationals whose overseas

activities have intended effects within the United States. Therefore, in very few
cases will United States firms actually be escaping anti-trust policies through

foreign expansion.
52. See, e.g., Ekundare, The Political Economy of Private Investment
in Nigeria, 10 journal of Modern African Studies 37 (1972); MacDonald, Recent
Legislation in Nigeria and Ghana Affecting Foreign Private Direct Investment,
6 International Lawyer 548 (1972).
53. Capital Investment Decree Part V. secs. 13-24, N.R.C.D. 141 at 5-8

(1973).
54. Capital Investment Decree, sec. 13, N.R.C.D. 141 (1973), Employment Tax Credit. "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment, the

Board may, in order to stimulate investment in labour-intensive industries, grant
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holidays 5 5 capital allowances, 5 6 deductions for scientific research, 5 1 and exemption from direct taxes and charges, 5 8 while
to a company approved under this Decree, during the continuance in force of
an agreement executed under subsection (3) of section 5 of this Decree, and
subject to the other provisions of this Decree, an employment tax credit for
a period not exceeding ten years from such date as the Board may determine."
Id. See also note 100 infra; The Ghanaian Times, What Price Foreign Investment? Jan. 27, 1977, col. 3. A tax holiday of 5-10 years does not affect the
most important consideration of the investor (the risk factor), as it is important
only if the investment is profitable.
Although an inefficient means of attracting foreign investment, such
tax holidays increase profits considerably and thus increase the cost of the
investment of the host country.
55. See Capital Investments Decree, sec. 14, N.R.C.D. 141 (1973).
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other
enactment, the Board may, in exceptional cases, where
the technology for a particular industry is necessarily
capital-intensive, grant income tax holiday to the
company concerned for a period not exceeding five
years from such date as the Board may determine.
Id. See also note 100 infra.
56. Id. sec. 15.
57. Id. sec. 16.
58. Id. sec. 18. That section provides incentives in the form of exemptions from the payment of indirect taxes and charges for specified periods.
Outside of these incentives, a number of foreign exchange difficulties in
Ghana have resulted in a shortage of imported raw materials and a lack of spare
parts which act as a disincentive to the establishment of new industries; further,
such difficulties hamper export diversification and expansion because existing
industries can operate at only 20-30% capacity.
The major foreign exchange problem is that in recent years inflation
has been running at 100-125%, which has put tremendous pressure on the
limited foreign exchange reserves. The authorized Ghanaian banks do not maintain foreign exchange balances, but receive their requirements from the central
bank of Ghana on a day-to-day basis. This provides a powerful incentive to use
the black market currency exchange, where the exchange rates are four times
higher than the official rate. See Ghana Abecor Country Report (1979); see also
FET 1979, supra note 4.
The sad fact is that potential United States and other foreign investors
have been discouraged by the continual difficulties in repatriating profits and
dividends. Other potential investors are discouraged by the difficulty of assuring an adequate supply of imported raw material and equipment, which problen has long plagued those companies that already operate in Ghana.
The Five-Year Development Plan seeks to eliminate the gap between
potential and actual tax collections. An integral part of this process will be
efforts to increase the amount of import duties by minimizing the number of
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indicating no restriction on the repatriation of profits.5 9 In fact,
the entire Capital Investments Decree could be described as a full
package of legislative inducements of various types. Economic
inducements may be termed multi-purpose instruments directed at
sectoral or regional allocation of investment activity. 60
These
economic inducements are a popular means of attracting foreign
investments to relatively deserted sectors or regions.
The policy behind these legislative and economic inducements
is based on certain underlying presumptions. It assumes that an
investor can be attracted by a promise of normalization of the
investment climate until it closely approaches the domestic environment. Maximum profit motives as well as a desire for appreciation in the value of their productive investment is assumed. In
addition, relief from the normal disincentive of taxation is assumed
to be a most efficient way of facilitating foreign investment needs,
thereby maximizing the flow of investment capital. But for these
incentives to be truly effective they must bear a close relationship
concessions granted to importers as well as preventing misclassification of
imported goods. Guidelines for the Five-Year Plan 1975-1980 para. 19(a).
59. See International Monetary Fund, 6 Surveys of African Economies
206 (1975). Under the Capital Investment Decree, companies with foreign
participation are, in principle, permitted to transfer freely their net profits after
tax, but at present, such transfers are authorized only on a limited basis. The
transfer of profits by companies that are either foreign-owned or owned or
controlled by non-residents and which have been financed with locally raised
capital, is not permitted. All outward capital transfers are subject, however, to
individual approval by the Bank of Ghana. Transfers of resident-owned capital
are not normally permitted by the Bank of Ghana. See also FET 1979, supra
note 4. Exporters are required to collect and repatriate the proceeds from their
exports within 60 days of shipment; export proceeds in foreign exchange must
be surrendered to a commercial bank in Ghana upon receipt. Exporters surrendering export proceeds in external African currencies or convertible currencies
are granted an export bonus. This bonus is 10% of the proceeds for all exports
except cocoa. Id. at 169. Cf. note 25 supra.
For the corporate investor, incentives for the reinvestment of profits in
Ghana rather than repatriation are mentioned in the Five-Year Plan at para. 20
(b). Cf. FET 1979, supra note 4, wherein it is stated that American and other
foreign investors are discouraged by the difficulties faced in repatriating profits
and dividends as well as assuring adequate supplies of imported materials to
companies operating in Ghana. See also note 61 infra.
60. See FET 1979,supra note 4,.at 12. A free zone in Ghana's main port

of Tema is now open to foreign investors. The basic infrastructure including
utilities is scheduled for completion in 1980.
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to the revealed preferences of individual investors and must outweigh
the perceived risks and the disincentives which result from other
aspects of government policy.
Although officially seeking foreign direct investments, certain
government actions more than offset its efforts. Foremost is the
issue of repatriation of profits and dividends. Under section 12 of
the Capital Investment Decree the government undertakes not to
restrict the repatriation of profits with the exception that the Commissioner may impose temporary restrictions in order to safeguard
the external payments position. According to IMF reports, these
"temporary" restrictions appear to be becoming permanent in nature
because of administrative bottlenecks designed to hamper the rewhen the temporary bans are lifted for
patriation of profits 6even
1
short periods of time.
These practices have the total effect of creating a negative
impact on the flow of foreign direct investments. Interpretation
of government action by investors is the key issue here. It is conceivable that the reaction of potential investors would have nothing
to do with either the validity or rationality of government action.
The second important action which temporarily created doubts
about the government's credibility was the repudiation of Ghana's
external debts by the military regime in 1972. In February of that
year the government, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the
external debts (which included profits and dividends) on the balance
of payments and the total economy of the country took the following actions: (1) cancellation of certain debts believed to have been
vitiated by corruption, fraud and other illegality, (2) agreed to the
repayment of long-term loans in accordance with existing terms, and
(3) declared its intention to make a "steady if even small reduction
in our short-term indebtedness as the nation's resources will
permit.'62
While there may have been valid reasons for the government's
drastic action, the repudiation alarmed both Ghana's creditors and
the international financial community at large. 6 3 Ghana and a group
61.
International Monetary Fund, 6 Survey of African Economies 207
(1975). See also Bank of Ghana, Ghana: Outstanding Applications as of March
31. 1974 for Transfers of Profits and Dividends Relating to Accounting Years,
1956/57-1974/75, Table XXXIII, which reflects total outstanding applications
numbering 120,574.
62. International Monetary Fund, 6 Survey of African Economics 198
(1975).
63. The Ghanaian Times, What Price Foreign Investment?Jan. 27, 1977
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of creditor countries met in Rome in 1974 in an effort to resolve
their differences and were at least partially successful. The parties
signed an Agreed Minute subject to ratification. But despite this
eventual agreement, Ghana's credibility was damaged by the repudiation. Investors are understandably hesitant to pour capital
into a- country whose future leaders fail to honor the obligations
of their predecessors.
In April 1975, the government issued the Investment Policy
Decree calling for Ghanaian participation in a wide range of foreign
business concerns. The Decree actually forced Ghanaian participation, but not necessarily government cooperation, in certain sectors.
It also established a body to evaluate the value of the assets of
foreign businesses affected by the Decree. A controversy arose concerning the valuation of the assets and the repatriation of the funds
accruing from the transfer of these assets. According to the United
States Embassy report from Accra, foreign investments have been
64
negatively affected as potential investors wait to see the outcome.
Another important action of the government that appears
to have had some negative effect on its efforts to induce investment
is the attempt to renegotiate the Valco Agreement with Kaiser
and Reynolds. 6 5 The Valco Agreement was considered by many
to have been a onesided contract in which Valco got the "lion's
The Ghanaian government assumed that the Agreement
share."
would result in the formation of an integrated industry, which would
both extract and process bauxite. When the mining of bauxite in
Ghana was found to be more expensive than importing bauxite from
Jamaica, the government's hopes for the development of an integrated industry within Ghana were frustrated and it sought renegotiation of the Agreement. Despite the changed circumstances, Valco
contended that the agreement should not be renegotiated. It is unnecessary to proceed to the merits of the controversy in order to
recognize its deleterious effect on Ghana's reputation among foreign
investors. A controversy of this sort inevitably raises doubts among
foreign investors concerning the government's willingness to comply

at 4, col. 3. See also IMF, 6 Surveys of African Economies 199 (1975). The
Agreed Minute provided for rescheduling of all principal and contractual interest
payments.
64. FET 1979,supra note 4, at 11.
65. See FET 1979, supra note 4. According to this report, the Kaiser
and Reynolds aluminum smelter plant accounts for 78% of the $325 million
total U.S. direct investment in Ghana. Id. at 4.
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with the terms of a contract after it becomes a burden to do so.
Careful planning is needed to minimize the danger of those
problems and to bolster investors' confidence in the enforceability
of their agreements with Ghana.
Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment
Some intellectual observers have seen the operations of MNCs
as blatant acts of exploitation at the expense of host countries.
Others, agreeing that there might be exploitation, stress that the
host countries nevertheless stand to benefit in several ways. They
argue that foreign investments bring about the transfer of foreign
capital and access to well organized foreign financial markets which
ordinarily would have been inaccessible to the host country. However, the benefits accruing from the transfer of foreign capital may
be limited, since it normally has to be repaid in foreign currency later
on. Closely related to this is the issue of foreign exchange and
balance of payments. Given a completely shattered balance of payments situation and a constantly deteriorating foreign exchange
position, a positive effect on both or either of these would be more
than palliative to Ghana. However, studies so far indicate that
foreign investments tend to have a negative effect on balance of
payments and foreign exchange in general. 6 6 This becomes more
of profits, dividends and repayment
obvious with the repatriation
67
of foreign debt/capital.
Another scarce commodity that foreign investment offers
Ghana is modern technology. The transfer of technology mad the
*training of local technical personnel have been one of the most attractive features of the multinational enterprise. 6 8 Unfortunately,
66. Main Findings of a Study of Private Foreign Investment in Selected
Developing Countries, UNCTAD, TD/B/C.3/111 (1973). See, e.g., The World

Bank, World Development Report (1980). Table 13 at 134 contains figures for
balance of payments and debt service ratios. The current account balance reflects the difference between (1) exports of good and services plus inflows of
unrequited official and private transfers and (2) imports of goods and services
plus unrequited transfers to the rest of the world. Interest payments on external
public and publicly guaranteed debt are excluded from that balance amount.

Id. at 161.
.67.

68.
(1973).

See note 59 supra.

United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development
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however, the transfer of technology has so far not yielded its fullest
potential benefits because the technology transferred is modern,
capital intensive and labor saving whereas the technology needed
is labor intensive. Ghana has a surplus of labor and little capital.
Capital intensive methods of production reduce the employment
effects of foreign investments. However, the total number of people
employed would increase, thus reducing unemployment. 6 9 According to Reuber, the direct employment70 contribution of foreign affiliates is modest in a global perspective.
Another significant potential offering of foreign investments
to Ghana is the training of local managerial staff by foreign enterprises. Such training has a direct effect on the operations of the
firms and affects the total economy through increased employment.
Foreign firms of investors also tend to have access to large
markets outside the host country. This offers an opportunity
to the host country to sell its products to those markets. The net
effect of this on the host country would tend to be positive. If
import substitution or export promotion or both are undertaken,
the domestic sectors would expand through the purchasing of inputs from various other sectors.
With their wealth of resources-human, financial and technological-the MNCs as foreign investors offer Ghana better and more
efficient production possibilities, better technology, increased employment opportunities, training for local technical personnel and
managerial experts, foreign capital and access to foreign financial
and product markets.
The Negative Effects of Conflicting Interests
The discussion of the wants and needs of both foreign investors
and the government of Ghana has revealed several areas of potential
or actual conflict. In fact, the area of foreign direct investment in
most developing countries is dominated by accusations, recriminations, denials, fear and mutual distrust. Host developing countries
are often painted, at best, as capricious, unsophisticated and insensitive to basic drives for profit. Moreover, they are perceived as having
69. Hyson & Weigel, Investment in the LDC's: The Unresolved Debate,
Colum. J. World Bus.,Jan.-Feb. 1970, at 33.
70. G. L. Reuber, Private Foreign Investment in Development 167-84
(1973).
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an almost irresistible tendency to confiscate foreign assets with
reckless disregard for foreign investors' interests. The MNCs, on
the other hand, are often faulted for their acquisitive tendencies.
These colossal companies engage in sophisticated acts of exploitation. They are seen to be insensitive to the basic human needs of
willing instruments of continued neothe poor and needy 7and
1
colonialist domination.
This picture may appear too grotesque to be true. But the
problem is not whether these accusations are true or false, but is
rather that these unhealthy attitudes exist. If the attitudes exist,
it makes the parties involved offensive or defensive, thereby creating
a serious communication barrier. The end result of such attitudes
can only be negative. Given the critical need for foreign direct
71. J. O'Connor, The Meaning of Economic Imperialism, in Imperialism
and Underdevelopment (R. Rhodes ed. 1970). The most important aspect of an
effective neo-colonialist policy is economic imperialism. The definition of economic imperialism is the economic domination of one region or country over another. Formal or informal control over local resources (including liquid and real
economic resources), is maintained to the advantage of the metropolitan power
and at the expense of the local economy. Freedom from colonialism and replacement with neocolonialist institutions have produced little change in terms
of the framework of economic relationships. In the pure case of neo.colonialism,
the allocation of economic resources, investment effort, legal and ideological
structures and other features of the old society have been preserved. Independence's only achievement has been the transfer of power from former colonial
masters to the domestic ruling class. This ineffectual transition was necessary to
further modem economic imperialism, for it requires the active participation of
the state in international economic relationships. lence, although countries
gained their political independence, they had to be kept economically dependent
and securely within the world capitalist system. Neo-colonialism was designed to
preserve this dependent relationship. Id. at 117-18. See also H. G. Johnson, A
Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States, in
The Multinational Enterprise in Transition (A. Kapoor & P. Grub eds. 1972). In
an attempt to strengthen their economic bases, underdeveloped countries strive to
replace reliance on imports with domestic production. Their efforts, however,
are often misguided. The economies of the situation would indicate that econoinic efficiency would be maximized through the principle of comparative
advantage.
In almost all the developing countries and new nations,
there is strong opposition to the investment of foreign
capital and to the employment of foreign scientific,
technical and managerial personnel, even though capital
and professional people are scarce and their scarcity
frequently constitutes the major bt.'tleneck in the process
of economic development. Both phenomena are clearly
derived from nationalism.
Id. at 327.
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investment in Ghana, the government must work to resolve the misunderstandings and conflicts. Otherwise, Ghana will not be able
to attract the investment it so critically needs.
A prime example of an area where suspicion and misunderstanding run rampant is the question of profit maximization alluded
to above. 72 The MNC essentially is an institution governed by the
profit motive. Its prime responsibility is to its shareholders and is to
see that capital is used profitably. In fact, profit maximization is
considered by Milton Friedman and his disciples to be the only social
responsibility of a corporation. 73 Profit motives are therefore seen
as commendable in a free market society and perhaps in the rest of
the world. Unfortunately, however, developing nations have not
progressed into an age where they can appreciate this basic attitude.
Their attitude is described by W. M. Clarke in the following terms:
What lies behind much of the thinking of the
developing countries is the idea that there is
somehow something wrong with the pursuit
concerns among the
of profit by commercial
74
needy.
and
poor
History, however, has continually demonstrated that basic economic
drives are not inherently or predominantly a phenomenon of Western
industrialized societies. Therefore, the issue between MNCs and
developing nations is not the profit motive per se, but the "fair and
equitable" distribution of profits between MNCs and the poor and
needy.
It is common knowledge that MNCs in Ghana and other developing countries have in the past, under the protection of colonial
laws, made excessive profits from ludicrously low-priced, long-term
mineral concessions for which they paid nominal rent and a minute
72.
73.

See, e.g., note 41 supra and accompanying text.
M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 133 (1962).
The view has been gaining acceptance that corporate officials and labor leaders have a 'social responsibility' that
goes beyond serving the interest of their stockholders or
their members. This view shows a fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a free economy. In
such an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in
free and open competition, without deception or fraud.

74.

W. M. Clarke, Private Enterprises in Developing Countries 8 (1966).

Id.
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In postthree to five percent of the declared gross profits. 75
independence Ghana, the rules of the game were changed by the
foreign investors.
There were several allegations of accounting,
pricing, invoicing and tax manipulations geared at shifting profits
from Ghana to other countries in an effort to avoid local taxes.
Some of these allegations have been confirmed by the Ghanaian
authorities. Instances of excessive effective rates of return reported
by Vaitsos 76 in Latin America, which oscillate between 32.1 percent and 96.21 percent with an average of 79.1 percent, tend to
77
support what has been described as a "monkey wrench" attitude.
Such financial juggling is a zero sum game: one man's profit is
another man's loss. It is the ability of the MNCs and other investors to use their resources to shift, transfer or reduce profits to the
detriment of host countries which is detested. In short, as much as
developing nations would welcome profits if they were distributed
fairly, they resent "monkey wrench" tendencies.
It may be recalled that one of the major objectives of the
government for encouraging foreign direct investment is to provide
overall economic development. This fundamental objective often
conflicts with the basic objectives of foreign investors, i.e., profit
maximization. Economic development and profit maximization are
not inherently self-opposing concepts, but in practice they often
are. In spite of earlier statements that profits undoubtedly promote
development, 78 there is now almost a general consensus that the
79
operations of MNCs do not generally spur economic development.
They may increase growth, but not development. Therefore, the
activities of the multinationals tend to accentuate rather than minimize the problems of development. They distort local economies
and reinforce inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. 8 0
Address by Dr. S. K. B. Asante, Deputy Attorney General of Ghana,
75.
Foreign Investment Process in Africa (1976) (unpublished lecture given at the
University of Michigan School of Law, Ann Arbor).
76. C. V. Vaitsos, Interaffiliate Charges by Transnational Corporations
and Inter-Country Income Distribution, (June 1972) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Harvard University).
77. R. J. Barnet and R. E. Muller, Global Reach, The Power of the
Multinational Corporations 124 (1974).
78. W. NI. Clarke, Private Enterprise in Developing Countries 7 (1966).
79. United Nations, The Impact of Mz:'tinational Corporations on
Development and on InternationalRelations, (No. E.74.II.A.5) E/5500/Rev. 1,
ST/ESA/6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Impact of Multinationals].
80. Impact of Multinationals,-supra note 79, at 33.
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Of late the issue of transfer pricing as a tool for shifting money
out of Ghana to avoid the very stringent foreign exchange rules
and regulations is gaining prominence in Ghana. The Ghanaian
Times carried several pages reciting areas of conflict between developing nations and foreign investors in which the issue of transfer
pricing was stressed. 8 1 A similar tool often used is over-invoicing
or under-invoicing. 8 2 The sum total of all these practices is that
the Ghanaian government is cheated out of its "fair share" of profits
arising from joint ventures, as well as taxes and other revenues
due to it from profits and export duties.
Of course the other side of the story is that Ghana for some
years placed a freeze on the repatriation of profits and dividends
in order to combat its deteriorating foreign exchange and balance
Sporadic announcements are made from
of payment problems.
time to time by the Bank of Ghana, but, according to the International Monetary Fund (IvF), these announcements are not only
short, but most often very ambiguous. 8 3 As a result, only a few
companies benefit from them and thus foreign investors feel tempted
to resort to the methods noted above to take profits from the
country. Several Lebanese companies have been nationalized for
rampant violations of over-invoicing and under-invoicing. One of
firms, R. T. Briscoe, has been nationalized for
the oldest German
84
the same reason.
81. The Ghanaian Times, What Price Foreign Investment?Jan. 27, 1977
at 4, col. 3.
82. W. Chudson, Africa and the MultinationalEnterprise, in Nationalism
and the Multinational Enterprise (H. R. Hahlo, J. G. Smith and R. W. Wright,
eds. 1973). In his article, the author expressed concern regarding direct foreign
investment in Africa. To begin with, the foreign firm as a result of its monpolistic or monopsonistic position, will earn high profits. Foreign firms employ
two methods to protect these profits and to escape the consequences of the
local tax system. The first is the under-invoicing of exports on the part of firms
acting as brokers in the marketing of commodities. The second, which is more
often practiced, is the over-invoicing of imports. If the tax system of the firm's
home country is reasonably efficient, the author observed, there could be
no strong motive for over-invoicing imports except as a means of evading either
existing or anticipated foreign exchange restrictions in the host country. id.

at 143.
83. See generally International Monetary Fund, 6.Surveys of African
Economies 206 (1975). See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 6 supra. See also International Monetary Fund 6 Surveys

of African Economies 207 (1975) where it is stated that all investment projects
must be submitted to the Capital Investment Board for approval, and both the
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Interests and needs again conflict in the transfer of technology.
Because of tile exclusiveness of the technology offered by MNCs,
it is an important source of power to them. For various reasons,
MNCs tend to transfer obsolete or over-priced technology. The
distribution of the last generation of technology is a good way to
prolong its profitability. Moreover, for efficiency, cost advantages
and so on, the technology used is often complicated and capital
intensive instead of labor intensive. 8 5 Thus the assets (abundant
labor) of the developing nations are
not utilized by the importa86
tion of capital intensive technologies.
Foreign capital is often seen as a means of reducing the burden of the balance of payments, but much to the chagrin of most
host countries, foreign direct investment results in a marginal or
negative effect on the balance of payments in the long run. 8 7 The
reasons are readily apparent. MNCs tend to finance their projects
with a disproportionate mix of local and foreign funds. 8 8 Since
the latter is most often the smaller, the inflow of foreign capital
is small. However, profits from the use of local funds are repatriated. Moreover, due to continuing inflation, the purchasing power
of the money received for primary products is at best fluctuating
investor and Government consent to the jurisdiction of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Furthermore, projects approved under
the decree shall not be subject to expropriation. However, in exceptional cases
where an approved project is taken over in the public interest, the Government
shall pay adequate compensation. See also Capital Investment Decree N.R.C.D.
141 (1973) para. 11(1).
85. Mansfield, Economic Impact of International Technology Transfer,
17 Research Management 7,9 (1974). See also United Nations, The Acquisition
of Technology from Multinational Corporations by Developing Countries,
(No. E74. II.A.7) ST/ESA/12 (1974).
86. It would be misleading to think that the source of this problem is
one-sided, however. It is reported that the governments of some developing
nations sometimes adamantly insist on the most up-to-date, complicated and
capital intensive technologies for purely prestigious reasons. It is therefore
not unlikely that a foreign investor might push labor-intensive technology only
to find it unacceptable to his host country.
87.
Barnet & Muller, Global Reach, The Power of the Multinational
Corporations 156 (1974).
88. See, eg., The Ghanaian Times, What Price Foreign Investment?
Jan. 27, 1977, at 4, col. 3. "Another reason for the high return to foreign
investmnent is that the foreign companies usually borrow money from the banks
of the host countries. Usually, these loans carry an interest ... less than the
interest rate prevailing in many developed countries." Id.
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and at worst continually decreasing. MNCs' inter-company pricing
and other accounting practices tend to aggravate the delicate existing
balance of the situation. Companies using export franchising would
also reduce export earning of the local subsidiary and hence the
foreign exchange. 8 9 The record so far shows that the Government
of Ghana is likely to nationalize or expropriate foreign firms engaging in illegal
or unethical methods to evade foreign exchange
90
regulations.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
In order for Ghana to receive the greatest benefit from foreign
direct investment at the least possible cost, specific projects should
be selected through the use of a cost-benefit analysis. Since relatively little has been written about cost-benefit analysis as it pertains
to foreign direct investment in developing countries, it is suggested
that the following model
be utilized as a means for selecting the
91
projects.
desirable
most
89. T. Parry, The International Firm and National Economic Policy:
Survey of Some Issues, Eco.J. (Dec. 1973).
90. A. Seidman, Ghana's Development Experience 1951-1965, (Doctoral Thesis Univ. of Wisconsin 1968).
91. The model produced below sets out the various stages in the process
of appraising and attracting investment projects. First, at position A in the diagram, the government, through an Economic Planning Committee, sets up the
role of foreign direct investment in the overall economy development strategy.
Given these objectives, the next crucial step would be to obtain from all the
sectors of the economy (position B) all possible investment projects which
fall within the policy objectives set out in A. The model given below outlines
only seven sectors for the sake of simplicity. It is not unusual for economic
planning to have a matrix of 29 sectors. A screening committee composed
of members of the Economic Planning Committee, the Attorney General,
financial and accounting experts, and the Capital Investment Board should
be set up to examine critically the costs and benefits of the projects submitted.
The Committee would be responsible for determining which projects would
be most beneficial to Ghana (position C). It would then seek appropriate
investors for the desired projects, relying, in part, on information obtained
from organizations such as the United Nations and the International Monetary
Fund. These investors would likely come from many of the developed nations
and would include individuals and companies other than the large MNCs who
have traditionally dominated foreign direct investment. The Committee would
be responsible for negotiations with potential investors (position D). The
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The model divides the costs of a contemplated project into
the quantifiable and the non-quantifiable. The quantifiable costs
would be further divided into the following categories:
1. Government's share of initial outlay and operational
costs.
Tax exemptions given to investors as inducements.
2.
3. Import and export duty tax exemptions.
4. Profit repatriation, debt service dividend payments,
etc.
Opportunity costs of 1-4.
5.
Remedial costs arising from pollution, industrial
6.
diseases and accidents, population relocation, etc.
All of the above would be discounted to their net present value
(NPV).

92

negotiation process would include agreement upon personalized incentives fitted
to the particular needs of the desired investors. These incentives would replace
the generalized incentives that are currently offered.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT SCREENING MODEL

A

GOVERNMENT'S
OBJECTIVES
B

D

C

Agriculture

UN

Mining and Smelting

IMF

Project 1

Canada

Trade

Project 2

France

Services

Project 3

Fed. Rep. of
Germany

GHANA
Project 4

Banking
Transport and

Screening
Committee

Japan
Project 5

USA

Communication
Project 6
Petroleum
Refining

UK
Project 7

92. S. Robock, K. Simmonds, J. Zwick, International Business and
Multinational Enterprises (1977). "Net present value" is the most widely used
method for evaluating investments. This method takes earnings over the life
of a project into account. Expected future net cash flows are discounted, using
the cost of capital as the discount rate. The original cost of capital is then deducted to determine the present net value of the project. id. at 499.
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Many of the true costs of a project are non-quantifiable in
nature. A dollar value cannot be affixed to dilution of the native
culture, an increase in crime, or the other possible societal consequences of a project. These costs must be weighed, however, if intelligent decisions are to be made. Since the ultimate goal of the
model is to select those projects which will have the greatest positive effect on the Ghanaian people, it would be counter-productive
to achieve economic goals at the expense of the environment, the
culture, or the people themselves.
Like costs, benefits may be quantifiable or non-quantifiable.
The following are perceived as quantifiable benefits likely to accrue
to the government from direct foreign investments:
1. Profits from the project due to the government as
a partner..
2. Taxes due to the government from the operations.
Foreign exchange saved as the result of the operations.
3.
4. The increase in the marginal productivity of labor
arising from the project.
Labor absorption rate (the rate at which labor will
5.
be absorbed by the new project if it is chosen).
Increased output in other sectors of the economy
6.
due to demands for goods and services generated by the project.
7. Contribution to GNP and growth.
Non-quantifiable benefits must also be delineated and evaluated. Increases in the self-esteem, independence and education of
the people cannot be given a dollar value, but can be given an arbitrary value assignment so that they can be balanced against nonquantifiable costs. For example, the employment of a given number
of people might result in an increase in morale and political stability
in addition to its economic benefits. These non-quantifiable benefits may be of greater import to the country than the economic
benefits. The model accounts for these non-quantifiables in the
second step of a two-step process.
In the first step, the quantifiable costs of a project are subtracted from the quantifiable benefits. If the result is negative, then
the project would be deemed non-viable and would receive no
further consideration. If the quantifiable benefits exceed the costs
the project would be further evaluated in step two.
The second step nets the non-quantifiable costs and benefits
of the project. As mentioned earlier, value assignments must be
assigned to every effect of the project. While it may be somewhat
artificial to balance a decrease in political unrest against an increase
in pollution, it must be recognized that these decisions are inescap-
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able. Assigning values to the various costs and benefits will result
in a consistent method of weighing the relative merits of each project. If the non-quantifiable benefits outweigh the costs, the government should solicit foreign investors who are willing to undertake the
project.
Before the government enters into negotiations with investors,
it should ascertain the feasibility of the specific project from the
perspective of the investor.
There are three frequently used
approaches:
(i) the pay back method, (ii) the net present value
approach9 3 (NPV), and (iii) the internal rate of return (IRR)
method.
The pay back period is the number of years it takes an investor
to recover its original investment from net cash flows.
In the net present value approach, the expected net cash flows
of an investment are taken over the entire life of the project and
discounted at the cost of capital. The initial cost outlay of the
project is subtracted then from it, resulting in either a positive or
negative NPV.
The internal rate of return is different from the NPV. It is
the interest rate which equates the present value of the expected
future cash flows or receipts to the initial cost outlay.
By applying these three methods to a specific project, the
government will gain an accurate perception of the project's appeal
to foreign investors. Armed with this information, the government can adopt a realistic stance in negotiations. If a project is
economically desirable to an investor, the government need make
few if any concessions. If the government desires a certain project
to be undertaken which is not attractive to investors, it will be%
willing to make greater concessions to induce participation by the
investor.
In all of these calculations, the risk factor cannot be ignored.
Investors will discount the expected rate of return to account for
the risks of nationalization, political upheaval and other occurrences
which would reduce profitability. To the extent that the government can minimize these risks, the project will be more desirable
to investors.
The next step is to look for those foreign investors who have
the most appropriate technological, managerial, and financial resources to fulfill the development objectives of the government.
These investors need not be in any particular country or the biggest

93.

See note 92 supra.
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MNCs. Medium size investors with the potential for growth may be
preferable, as they may demand a lower rate of return than the
largest investors.
Information about these investors is generally not easily available in Ghana or any other developing country. Therefore, it would
be necessary for efficient selection and bargaining to seek the assistance of institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMIF)
and some organs of the United Nations. These institutions, because
of their vast resources of skilled personnel, tend to have information
on multinational corporations. Specific requests should be made
for advice on locating investors who would offer the best technological, human and financial resource mix for the objectives of
Ghana.
Together with this, information should be obtained on
other investors in those particular industries under consideration.
This way the government can make a complete evaluation of all
possible investors before a final decision is made as to whom to
contact.
As noted earlier, this approach forces a reversal of the typical
investment cycle where MNICs looked for investment opportunities
in developing countries. The cycle is reversed in that the investment opportunities are taken to the MNCs and the host country is
playing the aggressive role.
The evaluative process advocated here should increase the
confidence of current and successive host governments in themselves and the benefits they receive from foreign direct investments.
It will improve the communication problem between host countries
and the MNCs and the confidence of the MNCs in the host governments as being able to manage their economies or at least taking
serious positive steps in that direction. The net effect would be
an improvement in the overall investment climate.
The current approach of ex post facto appraisal of MNC operations based on criteria and objectives of both parties which were
initially undeclared or merely implied but often conflicting when
actually identified is not satisfactory.
For, by whose criteria or
objectives must those evaluations be done? The procedure advocated
here should result in the identification and establishment of objectives and criteria ex ante by which ex post facto appraisals or evaluations of projects can be carried out. In other words, the rewards
and penalty rules of the cooperative ventures would have been established well in advanced and would le known by all. This should
result in the stabilizing of the relationships between the host government and the MNCs.
Lastly, the approach offered here would also reduce the chances
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of nationalization since host countries would be receiving the desired
benefits and the investments are in conformity with national development goals. Moreover the involvement of some international or
U.N. organ in the early stages or during negotiations is likely to be
an additional constraint on nationalization.
The adoption of the proposed model would increase investor
confidence in Ghana. The investor would have clear notice of
the guidelines governing its participation. Since these guidelines
were set forth by and advantageous to the government, there is
little risk that they would be changed "midstream." In addition,
properly selected projects would foster positive attitudes among
the people, thereby lessing the risks of strikes, sabotage or other
threats to profitability.
In order for the model to produce the desired effect, welltrained and impartial people must be employed in the various
decision making processes. If these decisions are not isolated from
political pressures and individual preferences, the model cannot
accomplish its function of selecting the most advantageous
projects.
When the cost-benefit analysis has been used to identify those
projects most beneficial to the development objectives of the host
nation it will then be necessary for the government to consider
what concessions will be necessary to attract the desired investors.
The continuing decrease in foreign capital inflow implies that
the very liberal concessions currently offered by the government of
Ghana have not had the desired effect on the investment decisions
of the MNCs and should force an inquiry into the validity of the
assumptions underlying these incentives. It should force a search
into the actual primary motivations for foreign direct investments
in developing countries. It should also compel a reexamination of
government action toward foreign investors. The results of these
inquiries could be the basis for new incentives and redirected gov.
ernment effort and action which together could increase foreign
investments in Ghana.
Since serious doubts exist as to the efficacy of current incentives, the next question to ask is what remedial steps should the
government of Ghana take if it wants foreign direct investments?
The first step should be to identify the fundamental motivations
behind foreign direct investments. Given these motivations, any
attempt at drawing up incentives to entice foreign investments
should be directed at those identified motivations which direct
investment behavior. Countries are likely to be misled by declarations such as those made by the International Chamber of Commerce
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on attracting foreign direct investments,9 4 which tend to focus on
issues which are peripheral to actual investment decision making.
Therefore, host countries should evaluate what foreign investors
actually do in addition to what they say.
Since firms' behavior varies greatly according to the type of
operation, the geographical location, general and indiscriminate
ex ante incentives may simply fail to attract a particular investor.
Ideally, incentives should be personalized and tailored according to
the observed behavior and interest of each investor. 95 Incentives
would then be part of the terms to be negotiated. In this way,
incentives could be tailored to the needs of the particular company
which is party to the negotiation. The model discussed earlier
96
provides a suitable base for the personalization of incentives.
In a dynamic business world, legislation meant to answer
the ever-changing motives of businessmen is likely to fail if it is not
adjusted frequently. Frequent changes might be costly in terms
of time and personnel. One potential solution is to frame incentive
legislation in very broad terms giving a screening committee the
power to identify and negotiate incentives deemed by it to be necessary for the particular project at hand. A provision of this nature
would actually be very flexible, would stand the test of time and
work to the benefit of the country if not abused.
Another option open to the government is to adopt legislation similar to the Jamaican Industrial Incentives Law 1956 (No.
45).97 This law provides the investor with two options for examption from income tax and import duties and gives the administration some latitude to deal with each applicant on a case-by-case
basis. Under the first option, an investor could receive a sevenyear tax exemption with normal depreciation. 9 8
The second
option permits the benefits to be spread out over a period of six
years and permits accelerated depreciation. The investor can choose
when to start enjoying the benefits but it should not be later than
99
three years.

94. See generally ICC Publishing Corp., Inc., 1212 Avenue of the
Americas, New York, N.Y., for various articles on foreign direct investment.
95. Dixon-Fyle, Economic Inducements to Private Investment in Africa,
4J. Dev. Stud. 127 (1967).
96. See note 91,supra.
97. Jamaican Indus. Incentives L. No. 45, secs. 10-12 (1956) as amended
by L. 12 (1960).
98. Id. at 8, Part II.
99. Id. at 9.
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The creation of differentiated categories of concessions to be
negotiated between the host country and the foreign investor perhaps offers another opportunity for effective inducement policies
rather than the monolithic and undifferentiated incentives found
in the legislation of many host countries. However, the problem of
this approach is that some incentives will still be entrenched in the
law, as opposed to a free-wheeling incentives system. The entrenchment of these incentives may encourage misapplication in that they
may be offered to investors who least deserve them. It should be
noted that incentives, like tax concessions, are issues which investors
worry about after they have decided that a particular project is
profitable to them. 10 0 Therefore, such incentives operate as economic rents (profits above normal profits). They do not contribute
to the decision to invest. To entrench them is to increase the profitability of an already appraised profitable project at the expense of
the host country. A variation of the Jamaican law would provide
unentrenched and differentiated incentives which could be negotiated. The foreign investor would choose the most suitable option
and the terms would be negotiated with the host country.
At the policy level, there is great need for harmonization of
incentives in developing nations. A great deal of similarity already
exists between various legislations1 0 1 but unfortuantely, new incentives are created by African governments competing for foreign
investments. In any case, the incentives African governments offer
do not per se contribute significantly to a firm's decision of where
to locate a plant. Therefore, harmonization and the elimination of
competitive incentives should not work to the detriment of any
country.
Government actions often speak louder than words. The government should develop a consistent policy toward foreign direct
investments. It should also follow its policies as strictly as possible.
This would create a predictable political climate in which investors
could operate with a minimum of apprehension. In fact, from the
revealed preferences of the investors discussed above, the ideal incentives should be improving the overall investment climate and not
offering overly liberal tax and other concessions to foreign investors.
100. See, e.g., The Ghanaian Times, What Price Foreign Investment?
Jan. 27, 1977, at 4, col. 4. "Many of these concessions, eg., tax holiday, do
not affect the most important consideration of the investor, viz the risk factor,
as they are only important if the investment is profitable." Id.
101. See note 97 supra.
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Conclusion
In spite of the volumes of literature devoted to the subject of
foreign direct investments in developing countries, there does not appear to be any systematic analytic approach which sets forth policy
guidelines for maximizing benefits accruing from foreign direct investments and minimizing overall costs to host developing countries.
An approach which would fulfill the goals of a host country such as
Ghana has been advocated. The task involves in-depth examination
of the role of foreign direct investments, the needs and offerings of
both investors and Ghana, and the fundamental motivations behind
investment activities not only in developing countries but overall.
A cost-benefit analysis model is then developed to insure that
the host country has a systematic approach to foreign investments.
The total effect of the procedures prescribed by the model would
be Ghanaian control of the type of incoming foreign direct investment as well as the type of industries in which investments are made.
It would also insure that only those investment projects which are
likely to have significant contributions toward the government's
economic development would be accepted. A country using this
approach does not have to rely on the generalized incentives approach to foreign investment. The country should be aggressive by
developing investment packages, identifying all potential foreign
investors and negotiating with them.
It is then that incentives
become important on a very personal case-by-case basis.
At the outset, the implementation of the model would be
costly. However, the contribution of foreign direct investment to
the economy should be significant and multiplicative in the long
run. Therefore, it is suggested that the model would not have an
overall negative effect on the economy of Ghana if adopted. It is
further suggested that there is a serious need to revise the rather liberal provisions of the Capital Investment Decree which do not appear
to have produced the intended favorable effect on foreign investments in Ghana.
Instead of conventional foreign direct investments, other alternatives such as management contracts and intergovernmental projects
should be given serious consideration. Finally, it should be noted
that foreign direct investments involve compromise, consistency,
political stability, credibility and mutual respect of all parties involved. Given these, a favorable investment climate is likely to
exist and capital inflow would increase without overly liberal fiscal
incentives or wooing from the government of Ghana.

